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In the classic 1947 movie “Miracle on 34th Street,” 1 Macy’s
Department Store’s Santa Claus claims to be the real Kris Kringle and is
committed to Bellevue Mental Hospital. Kringle challenges his
commitment in court at a formal hearing, in which Kringle’s lawyer
argues that Kringle is sane because he really is Santa Claus. There is a
scene that illustrates the classic conflict in ideology as to how, in reality,
our judges are selected. In the movie, the trial judge wants to expedite
the hearing, finding the claim by “Kris Kringle” ridiculous. However,
his political advisor 2 warns him of the consequences of ruling that there
is no Santa Claus because the judge is up for re-election. 3 For those
favoring election of judges, this is democracy in action. A judge’s
perhaps precipitous action is tempered by his recognition that the voters

*Dean and Randolph Baxter Professor of Law, University of Akron School of Law. B.A. Temple
University; J.D. Columbia University School of Law; Dip. Crim., Cambridge University.
1. MIRACLE ON 34TH STREET (Twentieth Century Fox 1947).
2. The political advisor, Charlie Halloran, is played by William Frawley. Some of you are
old enough to remember that Mr. Frawley played Fred Mertz on “I Love Lucy.”
3. For those of you who have forgotten the story, when the post office delivers sacks and
sacks of letters addressed to Santa Clause to the individual who calls himself “Mr. Kringle,” sitting
in the courtroom, the judge rules that if the government of the United States believes him to be the
real St. Nick, who is he to argue!
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who observe his behavior will determine his future career. For those
opposing election of judges, this is the worst kind of political influence.
A party hack, called a political advisor, tells a judge how he should rule.
I. CAPERTON V. A.T. MASSEY COAL CO.
Moving up to the early 21st century, a recent case, which was the
basis for a John Grisham novel, 4 also illustrates the impact of and debate
over the method of selection of judges. A.T. Massey Coal Company
was sued by Hugh Caperton for interfering in his contractual relationship
with a third company. 5 Caperton won a $50 million verdict. 6
Don Blankenship, the Chairman, CEO and President of Massey
Coal Company 7 was obviously concerned that the West Virginia
Supreme Court of Appeals might uphold the $50 million jury verdict.
However, his case would not be decided until after the next election and
one of the sitting Justices, Warren McGraw, who was most likely to vote
against him, was up for re-election. 8 Blankenship had counted the votes.
If he could get one more State Supreme Court Justice on his side, he
would win his appeal. In other words, if Blankenship could oust
McGraw and replace him with his opponent, Brent Benjamin, and let
Benjamin know that Blankenship’s support led to his election,
Blankenship could win the appeal.
Both directly and indirectly, Blankenship donated more than $2.5
million to the Benjamin campaign and also paid out $500,000 in
independent expenditures and direct mailings to support Benjamin.9 As
stated by the United States Supreme Court:
To provide some perspective, Blankenship’s $3 million in
contributions were more than the total amount spent by all the other
Benjamin supporters and three times the amount spent by Benjamin’s
own committee. Caperton contends that Blankenship spent $1 million
more than the total amount spent by the campaign committees of both
candidates combined. 10

4. See JOHN GRISHAM, THE APPEAL (2008); Joan Biskupic, “Supreme Court case with the
TODAY,
Feb.
16,
2009,
feel
of
a
best
seller”,,
USA
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-02-16-grisham-court_N.htm.
5. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 690 S.E.2d 322, 329-32 (W.Va. 2009), rev’d, 129 S.
Ct. 2252, 2257 (2009).
6. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Corp., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2256 (2009).
7. See id. at 2257.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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When the case finally came before the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals, Caperton asked Benjamin to recuse himself.11
However, Benjamin refused and then cast his vote to make the three to
two majority that reversed the jury’s verdict against Massey (and
Blankenship). 12 Caperton first sought reconsideration from the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, 13 and when that was denied, sought
and received a grant of certiorari from the United States Supreme
Court. 14 The United States Supreme Court reversed the decision below
in a five to four decision, Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Company,15
stating that the due process clause mandated recusal in this case where
there was a serious risk of bias, as indicated by the large campaign
contributions involved and the “temporal relationship between the
campaign contributions, the justice’s election, and the pendency of the
case.” 16 No proof of actual bias was needed. 17
Massey argued against overturning the West Virginia Supreme
Court’s decision and the denial of the recusal request by stating that “in
the end the people of West Virginia elected [Benjamin].”18
Blankenship’s contributions were just one factor, among others, that
contributed to his success. 19 Massey and others also warned that to
overturn the West Virginia court might lead to “unnecessary interference
with judicial elections.” 20 But, the Supreme Court, per Justice Kennedy,
held that this was an extraordinary case and “application of the
constitutional standard in this case [that the potential for bias was a
violation of the due process clause] will thus be confined to rare
instances.” 21

11. Id.
12. Id. at 2258.
13. After the request for a rehearing, two of the five justices were disqualified. One of the
justices who voted for the coal company had been photographed vacationing with Blankenship in
the French Riviera when the case was pending. A justice who voted for Caperton recused himself,
at the request of Blankenship, because of his public criticism of Blankenship’s role in the judicial
election. Benjamin refused to disqualify himself and then, as acting Chief Justice, picked the two
replacements. A divided court then voted again, 3 to 2, to reverse the jury verdict. Caperton, 129 S.
Ct. at 2258-59.
14. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 S. Ct. 593 (2008).
15. Caperton, 129 S. Ct. 2252.
16. Id. at 2264.
17. Id. at 2263 (“[O]bjective standards may also require recusal whether or not actual bias
exists or can be proved.”).
18. Id. at 2264.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 2265.
21. Id. at 2267.
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Again, the debate over this case focused on the interaction of
democratic principles and judicial independence. For those supporting
the popular election of judges, Caperton is the exception that proves the
rule. It is the “extreme and rare” case that requires action. As detailed
by Justice Scalia for the Supreme Court in Republican Party of
Minnesota v. White, 22 voters have a right to know what judicial
candidates’ views are in order to determine if they should vote for that
candidate, and interest groups have a right to know a judicial candidate’s
views in order to determine if they should support or oppose a
candidate. 23 Such support is not only appropriate, but is the core of the
democratic principle of “representative government.” 24 Impartiality,
which under one definition means “lack of preconception in favor or
against a particular legal view[,] . . . is not a compelling state interest”
justifying restrictions on a judicial candidate’s election speech. 25
“‘[D]ebate on the qualifications of candidates’ is ‘at the core of our
electoral process and of the First Amendment freedoms . . . .’” 26 The
“complete separation of the judiciary from the enterprise of
‘representative government’” is not a true picture of the American
system. “Not only do state court judges possess the power to ‘make’
common law [like a legislator], but they have the immense power to
shape the States’ constitutions as well.” 27
For those opposing the election of judges, Caperton is an excellent
example of the inherent problem of forcing judges to run for office and
the necessity for them to secure campaign contributions to do so. Such
contributions will have an impact and, in some cases, a determining
impact on the elected judge’s decision-making. 28 As described by
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in her concurring opinion in Republican
Party of Minnesota v. White:
[T]he very practice of electing judges undermines [the government’s
interest in an impartial judiciary]. . . . [I]f judges are subject to regular
elections, they are likely to feel they have at least some personal stake
in the outcome of every publicized case. Elected judges cannot help
22. 536 U.S. 765 (2002).
23. Id. at 782, 788.
24. Id. at 784.
25. Id. at 777 (emphasis in original).
26. Id. at 781 (quoting Eu v. San Francisco Cnty. Democratic Cent. Comm., 489 U.S. 214,
222-23 (1989)) (emphasis added).
27. Id. at 784.
28. See Genelle I. Belmas & Jason Shepard, Speaking from the Bench: Judicial Campaigns,
Judges’ Speech and the First Amendment, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 709, 711 (2010).
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being aware that if the public is not satisfied with the outcome of a
particular case, it could hurt their reelection prospects. . . . Moreover,
contested elections generally entail campaigning. And campaigning
for a judicial post today can require substantial funds [and thus]. . .
fundraising. Yet relying on campaign donations may leave judges
feeling indebted to certain parties or interest groups. 29

II. IOWA AND SAME-SEX MARRIAGE
The most recent example of the conflict between those supporting
elections of judges and those who believe elections compromise judicial
independence occurred in Iowa in the 2010 election. On April 3, 2009, a
unanimous seven justice Iowa Supreme Court held that denying samesex couples the right to marry was a violation of various liberty and
equality rights, which could be summarized in the doctrine of equal
protection, protected by the Iowa Constitution. 30
In 2010, three of the justices came before the voters in a judicial
retention election.31 A push to oust these justices was made by a series
of citizens’ groups. The push was led by the Washington-based National
Organization for Marriage and by Iowans for Freedom, an organization
started and directed by Robert Vander Plaats, the former Republican
gubernatorial candidate and Sioux City businessman. 32 Although all
campaign reports are not in yet, over $1 million was spent to defeat these
justices. 33 The Iowan Justices involved chose not to counter the
campaign, but their supporters urged their retention, based on the
concept of merit selection and an independent judiciary. 34

29. 536 U.S. at 788-90 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
30. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W. 2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
31. They were Justices David Baker, Michael Streit, and Marsha Ternus. Krissah Thompson,
Gay Marriage Fight Targeted Iowa Judges, Politicizing Rulings on Issue, WASH. POST, Nov. 3,
2010.
32. Id.
33. Memorandum from Rachel Paine Caufield, AJS Hunter Center for Judicial Selection to
AJS Bd. of Dirs. (Nov. 3, 2010) (on file with author) [hereinafter Caufield Memo]. AJS is the
American Judicature Society. I serve as Chair of the National Advisory Commission for AJS and
am a member of the AJS Board of Directors. AJS states that its mission “is to secure and promote
an independent and qualified judiciary and a fair system of justice.” See 94 Judicature, Sept.-Oct.,
2010, Inside Cover.
34. See Caufield Memo, supra note 33; Editorial, In Too Many States, Judges Face Reprisals
for Unpopular Rulings, USA TODAY, Oct. 19, 2010, at 8A [hereinafter Too Many States];
Thompson, supra note 31.
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On Tuesday, November 2, 2010, all three Iowa Supreme Court
Justices were voted out of office, with approximately 54% of the voters
rejecting their bids for retention.35
Supporters of this ouster argue that this was a victory for the
people. “Judges derive their power from the people [and] . . . the voters
of Iowa have the civil right, and duty, to hold the judges accountable.”36
This decision will “send a message across the country that the power
resides with the people.” 37
Opponents of the ouster see this vote as a threat to judicial
independence. Here, judges “did their jobs. They read the state
constitution without regard to politics, public opinion, or the passions of
the moment.” It would be hard to overstate the importance of the
principle of judicial independence. Few scenes in American history are
uglier than those written when public opinion, sometimes vicious, has
ruled the courts.38
Courts have historically been “protector[s] of minority rights [and
the decision] ‘really might cause judges in the future to be less willing to
protect minorities out of fear that they might be voted out of office.’” 39
So, this is the conflict and it goes to some fundamental values in
American society. Do we want all decisions to be decided by a
majority? Or do we want the safeguard of an impartial and independent
judiciary system?
III. WHAT IS “JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE” AND IS IT IMPORTANT?
In Justice Stevens’ dissent in Republican Party of Minnesota v.
White, he distinguished the work of a judge from other political officials:
In a democracy, issues of policy are properly decided by majority vote;
it is the business of legislators and executives to be popular. But in
litigation, issues of law or fact should not be determined by popular
vote; it is the business of judges to be indifferent to unpopularity. . . .

35. Caufield Memo, supra note 33; Editorial, Election Takeaways, USA TODAY, Nov. 4,
2010, at 8A.
36. Brian S. Brown, Opposing View On Judicial Independence: Hold Judges Accountable,
USA TODAY, Oct. 18, 2010, at 8A.
37. A.G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4,
2010, at A1 (quoting Robert Vander Plaats).
38. Editorial, Election Takeaways: From Iowa, a Chilling Message to Judges, USA TODAY,
Nov. 5, 2010, at 8A. The Editorial made an interesting analogy:
“At his confirmation hearing,
U.S. Chief Justice John Roberts famously compared the role of a judge to that of an umpire calling
balls and strikes. Imagine what would happen to the integrity of baseball if umpires were hounded
from the field for making calls the home crowd didn’t like.” Id.
39. Sulzberger, supra note 37 (quoting U.C. Irvine Law School Dean Erwin Chemerinsky).
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Consistent with that fundamental attribute of the office, countless
judges in countless cases routinely make rulings that are unpopular and
surely disliked by at least 50 percent of the litigants who appear before
them. It is equally common for them to enforce rules that they think
unwise, or that are contrary to their personal predilections. . . . [A
judge] has a duty to uphold the law and to follow the dictates of the
Constitution. If he is not a judge on the highest court in the State, he
has an obligation to follow the precedent of that court, not his personal
views or public opinion polls. . . . [He or she is to decide] on the merits
of individual cases, not as a mandate from the voters. . . . [T]he judicial
reputation for impartiality and open-mindedness is compromised by
electioneering that emphasizes the candidate's personal predilections
rather than his qualifications for judicial office. 40

Justice Ginsburg, citing a number of Supreme Court decisions, goes
even further: “The guarantee of an independent, impartial judiciary
enables society to ‘withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of
political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the
courts.’” 41 “‘Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or
privileges would amount to nothing.’” 42
IV. THE “TRIPLE WHAMMY” THREAT TO JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
In addition to Iowa, various interest groups launched ouster
campaigns in Alaska, Colorado, Kansas, Illinois and Florida.43 They all

40. 536 U.S. 765, 798-802 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 804 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 638 (1943)).
42. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 466 (Alexander
Hamilton) (C. Rossiter ed., 1961). She explains:
Whether state or federal, elected or appointed, judges perform a function
fundamentally different from that of the people’s elected representatives. Legislative
and executive officials act on behalf of the voters who placed them in office; “judge[s]
represent[t] the Law.” Unlike their counterparts in the political branches, judges are
expected to refrain from catering to particular constituencies or committing themselves
on controversial issues in advance of adversarial presentation. Their mission is to decide
“individual cases and controversies” on individual records, neutrally applying legal
principles, and, when necessary, “standing up to what is generally supreme in a
democracy: the popular will.”
A judiciary capable of performing this function, owing fidelity to no person or party,
is a "longstanding Anglo-American tradition,” an essential bulwark of constitutional
government, a constant guardian of the rule of law.
Id. at 803-04 (internal citations omitted).
43. Sulzberger, supra note 37.
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failed. 44 Still, more was spent on retention elections in 2010 than was
spent in the previous decade. 45 In addition, increasing amounts are
being spent on regular elections of judges, often on an ideological and
partisan basis. 46 While there have been numerous cases in the past thirty
years where the popular election of judges, either directly or through
retention votes, has led to pitched and often ideological battles,47 a series
of United States Supreme Court decisions in the past decade have made
the judicial election process even more ideological and issue based.
V. SECURING THE POSITION OF CANDIDATES
First, in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, a five to four
decision written by Justice Antonin Scalia, the United States Supreme
Court held that any restrictions placed on judges running for re-election
or retention and judicial candidates “from announcing their views on
disputed legal and political issues” is in violation of the First
Amendment. 48 Thus, an interested party (and potential or actual large
contributor) can demand that a judge or a judicial candidate announce
his or her views on an issue of great import to the contributor as a
condition precedent to a gift. The judge or candidate can no longer rely
on state statutes or judicial canons as a basis to refuse this request.49
VI. FUNDING FAVORED CANDIDATES
Next, as early as 1976, the United States Supreme Court in Buckley
v. Valeo stated that there can be no limitations on independent campaign
spending by individuals and groups, corporations, and unions in any
election, including judicial elections. While limits can be placed on the
amount that can be contributed directly to a candidate, restrictions on
independent expenditures violate that entity’s free speech rights. 50 In
2003, however, the Court in McConnell v. Federal Election Commission
44. Id.
45. Id. (citing the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University Law School). Thirtyeight states select justices to their highest courts through popular elections. Seventeen of these use
“merit selection and retention” systems. Justices in twenty-one states are picked in contested
elections. Kenneth Jost, CQ Press, Judicial Elections: Are Races for Judgeships Bad for Justice?,
19 CQ Researcher 373, 376 (2009) [hereinafter Judicial Elections].
46. See Jost, Judicial Elections, supra note 45, at 375-76.
47. Id. at 382.
48. 536 U.S. 765, 768, 788 (2002).
49. See MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(B) (1972); MINN. CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 5(a)(3)(d)(i) (2000). Justice Scalia specifically referenced these two Canons in
Republican Party, 536 U.S. at 768.
50. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976) (per curiam).
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held that a federal statute could not only prohibit corporations and
unions from direct contributions to a candidate but could also bar
“electioneering communication," or “speech expressly advocating the
election or defeat of a [specific] candidate.”51 Corporations were free,
under federal law, to use independent expenditures to engage in political
speech, so long as that speech did not expressly advocate the election or
In addition,
defeat of a clearly identified federal candidate.52
independent committees and political action committees (PACs), could
collect funds and make independent expenditures on behalf of
candidates. 53
In 2009, in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the
Court, in a five to four opinion by Justice Kennedy, reconsidered and
overruled even the limited restrictions placed on corporations and unions
in McConnell. 54 The Court reasoned that, “[t]he First Amendment does
not permit Congress to make . . . categorical distinctions based on the
corporate identity of the speaker and the content of the political
speech.” 55
The results of this series of decisions have been a dramatic growth
in the amount of campaign expenditures by independent groups
advocating particular issues or positions that will come before state
courts. From 1990 to 2009, candidates in state high court races raised
$207 million, as compared to $83.3 million in the previous decade.56
The largest contributors were the business groups, trial lawyers groups,
unions, and, of course, political parties. 57 Many of the contributors, who
must disclose their identities in these ads, use names that hide their true
identity. For example, the “Partnership for Ohio’s Future” is funded by
the U.S. and Ohio Chamber; “Texans for Public Justice” was funded by
plaintiffs’ lawyers; and the “Center for Individual Freedom” was funded
by large tobacco companies. 58 Issue-based ads, especially television
commercials funded by these interest groups, 59 not only impact elections

51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.

540 U.S. 93, 203-09 (2003).
See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, 551 U.S. 449, 457 (2007).
See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 149 (2003).
Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2009).
Id. at 913.
James Sample, Adam Skaggs, Jonathan Blitzer, & Linda Casey, THE NEW POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL ELECTIONS, 2000-2009:
A DECADE OF CHANGE, at 1 (2010), available at
http://www.brennancenter.org/content/resource/the_new_politics_of_judicial_elections/.
[hereinafter THE NEW POLITICS 2009-2010].
57. Id. at 13-15.
58. Id. at 42-54.
59. See Editorial, Judges and Money, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 30, 2010, at A18.
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but also “corrode public confidence in the judicial system.” 60 A 2009
USA Today Gallup poll “found that 89 percent of those surveyed
believed that campaign contributions were problematic and could
influence a judge’s rulings.” 61
VII. RECUSAL OR DISQUALIFICATION
Supporters of the election of judges argue that even if potential
contributors can demand that recipients indicate their position on issues
and even if there can then be unlimited campaign contributions based on
these announced positions, this does not necessarily mean that such
individuals cannot and will not be “independent” in individual cases. As
Justice Scalia argued in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White,
impartiality is not the same as independence.62 Having an opinion as to
the issues involved in a case does not necessarily show a bias towards a
party in the proceeding. 63
A judge’s lack of predisposition regarding the relevant legal issues in a
case has never been thought a necessary component of equal justice,
and with good reason. For one thing, it is virtually impossible to find a
judge who does not have preconceptions about the law. . . . Indeed,
even if it were possible to select judges who did not have preconceived
views on legal issues, it would hardly be desirable to do so. “Proof
that a Justice’s mind at the time he joined the Court was a complete
tabula rasa in the area of constitutional adjudication would be
evidence of lack of qualification, not lack of bias.” 64

Having an opinion is not the same as not being open-minded,
continues Justice Scalia:
This quality in a judge demands, not that he have no preconceptions on
legal issues, but that he be willing to consider views that oppose his
preconceptions, and remain open to persuasion, when the issues arise
in a pending case. This sort of impartiality seeks to guarantee each
litigant, not an equal chance to win the legal points in the case, but at

60. Sample et al., THE NEW POLITICS 2009-2010, supra note 56, at 22 (quoting Governor and
former District Attorney Edward Rendell of Pennsylvania).
61. Editorial, Judges for Sale, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 2010, at A12 [hereinafter Judges for
Sale].
62. 536 U.S. 765, 775-79 (2002).
63. Id. at 777-78.
64. Id.
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Statements of opinion are not
least some chance of doing so.
“promises” to vote a particular way. 65

We must trust our judges. 66 Elected judges “always face the
pressure of an electorate who might disagree with their rulings and
therefore vote them off the bench.” 67 But, this has not stopped judges
from ruling against the majorities’ wishes.68
Moreover, as Justice Kennedy states in his concurrence in
Republican Party of Minnesota, States can adopt strict recusal standards
to assure judicial independence.69 Recusal is an adequate remedy for
problems associated with campaign contributions and free speech
protections for contributors and judges. 70
The Caperton decision would seem to support Justice Kennedy’s
concept that recusal is a significant remedy for any negative impacts
from the process of electing judges. But, in fact, Caperton stands for the
opposite position. The case does set some outside limits on how far
present law will allow a particular judge to participate in a case where
there is a showing of issue based campaign contributions and explicit
statements (and perhaps even quiet, secret commitments) on specific
issues. But, the case itself indicates how weak those limitations are.
In Caperton, four dissenting Justices argue that explicit conflicts
are necessary in order to mandate disqualification or recusal—a financial
interest in the outcome or criminal contempt prosecutions where the
contempt was against the judge.71 “Vaguer notions of bias or the
appearance of bias were never a basis for disqualification . . . . All
judges take an oath to . . . apply the law impartially and we trust that
they will live up to this promise.” 72
Even the majority was unwilling to be specific about what should
be the basis for mandated recusal or disqualification.73 The Court would
not claim that even campaign contributions by a litigant or attorney
would create a probability of bias or serve as a basis for mandated

65. Id. at 778-79.
66. See id. at 796 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“We should not, even by inadvertence, ‘impute
to judges a lack of firmness, wisdom, or honor,’” citing Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 273
(1941)).
67. Id. at 782.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 794 (Stevens, J., concurring).
70. See Belmas & Shepard, supra note 28, at 732-33.
71. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Corp., 129 S. Ct. 2252, 2257 (2009) (Roberts, C.J.,
dissenting).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 2272 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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recusal. The facts in Caperton indicate that “this is an exceptional
case.” 74 The facts are “extreme by any measure.”75 States have adopted
objective standards of judicial conduct as to the appearance of
impropriety and disqualification when there is an issue of impartiality. 76
In other words, even for the majority, decisions on recusal and
disqualification are to be made by the judges themselves and only in the
extreme case will there ever be a constitutional review of a judge who
does not recuse or who is not disqualified by fellow jurists. 77 There are
inherent problems with recusal or disqualification procedures. As
described by Professor Gerald J. Clark:
Under the rules of court of most jurisdictions, an application to recuse
is heard, at least in the first instance, by the targeted judge. A recusal
motion’s usefulness is limited because a party may be reluctant to
suggest to the judge of the party’s case that the judge has an ethical
problem—such a suggestion may generate retaliation [and even then
recusal]. . . . is available only in situations where the personnel is
fungible—where an adequate and qualified substitute is readily
available. . . . [Because] the targeted judge must judge herself[,] [t]he
judge thus has a conflict of interest in deciding . . . [and] alternatives,
especially in a court of last resort, are similarly flawed, assuming a

74. Id. at 2263.
75. Id. at 2265.
76. Id. at 2266-67 (“Almost every state . . . has adopted the American Bar Association’s
objective standard: A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety. . . . The
ABA’s Model Code’s test for appearance of impropriety is ‘whether the conduct would create in
reasonable minds a perception that the judge’s ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with
integrity, impartiality and competence is impaired.’”).
77. In a situation not involving campaign contributions, but acceptance of gifts by the Chief
Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the New York Times opined:
[Under the policies set by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court], all state judges . . . can
accept any gifts if they disclose them. . . . It permits violations of the American Bar
Association’s Model Rules of Judicial Conduct, by casting doubt on judges’ “capacity to
act impartially.” . . . In his 17 years on the court, [Chief Justice Castille] stated, “no party
has sought recusal on the basis of my financial disclosures. . . . [However, the rule
against accepting gifts] is to free a judge from having to worry about whether he or she is
influenced, without realizing it. Another is to assure citizens who depend on the court’s
fairness that the judge can’t be influenced by anything but the essentials of a case. . . .
There is a growing consensus—outside the court—that the justices should change how
they handle recusal: requiring a justice to explain any decision to recuse or not, and
having a group of justices review each recusal decision.
Editorial, Untenable Judicial Ethics, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2010, Sunday Opinion, at WK7
[hereinafter Untenable Judicial Ethics].
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reluctance of members of a court to make an accusatory finding against
a colleague. 78

It must be noted here that West Virginia’s recusal rules model and
the rules in most of the other states where judges face election and the
“insufficiency and impotence” of these rules indicate the flaws in selfregulation. 79 And, in the remand in Caperton, the same result occurred
in a decision by the West Virginia Supreme Court, which did not include
the recused Justice Benjamin. 80
VIII. IS REFORM OF THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM POSSIBLE?
The core principle of any system of justice is judicial independence.
International and domestic principles of the rule of law, including
the internationally respected model The Bangalore Principles of Judicial
Conduct, require that judges be impartial. To the same effect are the
United Nations Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, noting
that judges shall decide “impartially . . . without any improper
influences, inducements . . . for any reason.” The United States
Supreme Court has recognized “a litigant's due process right to a fair
trial before an unbiased judge.” The lack of bias is a “cardinal principle
of justice” and an “indispensable feature of democracy.” 81
Obviously, those interested in the independence of the judiciary
should make every effort to reform the present system within
constitutional limits. 82 But those “constitutional limits” are the “triple
whammy”: (1) the First Amendment protection of the right of judges
and judicial candidates to give specific, explicit statements as to their
positions on issues; (2) the First Amendment right of entities to support
with unlimited resources, judicial candidates, and often without
disclosure of the real source of this campaign support; and (3) finally,
any application of restrictive rules are to be enforced by the involved

78. Gerald J. Clark, Caperton’s New Right to Independence in Judges, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 661,
692-93 (2010).
79. See James Sample, Court Reform enters the Post-Caperton Era , 58 DRAKE L. REV. 787,
791 (2010) [hereinafter Court Reform].
80. Caperton v. A.T. Massey, 690 S.E.2d 322, 328 (W. Va. 2009).
81. Norman L. Greene, How Great Is America's Tolerance for Judicial Bias? An Inquiry into
the Supreme Court’s Decisions in Caperton and Citizens United, Their Implications for Judicial
Elections, and Their Effect on the Rule of Law in the United States, 112 W. VA. L. REV. 873, 883-85
(2010).
82. For a description of many of these proposed reforms, see Sample, Court Reform, supra
note 79, at 793-818; Sample et al., THE NEW POLITICS 2009-2010, supra note 56, at 67-77.
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judges themselves, or by the limited oversight that courts will exercise
over their colleagues.
This may mean that independence is not really possible in any
elected judges system. As noted by Justice Kennedy in New York State
Board of Elections v. Lopez Torres:
When one considers that elections require candidates to conduct
campaigns and to raise funds in a system designed to allow for
competition among interest groups and political parties, the persisting
question is whether that process is consistent with the perception and
the reality of judicial independence and judicial excellence. The rule
of law, which is a foundation of freedom, presupposes a functioning
judiciary respected for its independence, its professional attainments,
and the absolute probity of its judges. And it may seem difficult to
reconcile these aspirations with elections. 83

Some of the remedies that have been considered include public
financing and mandatory spending limits, but both would be ineffectual
because of the First Amendment free speech protections for independent
expenditures by outside and often invisible groups.84 Another remedy is
stricter rules on judges to recuse themselves, 85 and for judges, other than
the challenged one, to handle disqualification motions. 86 However,
judges often run on political tickets, and an appointment can be seen as a
reward for long-term political service and so elected legislators are
reluctant to depoliticize the judicial selection process.87 Moreover,
judges are reluctant to set limits on themselves and their colleagues,88
and even if rules are established, they are often vague and judges are
reluctant to forcefully apply them. 89 And if legislatures seek to adopt
recusal and disqualification rules, this can lead to “inter-branch conflict
. . . even conflict in which a statute is explicitly struck down.” 90

83. 552 U.S. 196, 212 (2008) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
84. See Jost, supra note 47 at 378.
85. See Untenable Judicial Ethics, supra note 77; Sample, Court Reform supra note 79, at
818; Belmas & Shepard, supra note 28 at 732-36 (suggesting standards for recusal).
86. Clark, supra note 78 at 699 (citing ABA Standing Committee on Judicial Independence,
Report to the House of Delegates (2009)).
87. See Greene, supra note 81 at 905.
88. See id. at 904.
89. See Jost, supra note 45 at 379.
90. William Raftery, “The Legislature Must Save the Court from Itself”?: Recusal,
Separation of Powers and the Post-Caperton World, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 765, 783 (2010).
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IX. CONCLUSION
The bottom line is that electing judges is “incompatible with the
ideal of an independent judiciary.” 91
The job of judging is fundamentally incompatible with political
elections. Judges are expected to make difficult and unpopular decisions
based on the law and the facts of each case, whereas elected officials in
the political branches are expected to be responsive to constituencies in
order to be re-elected. 92
Judicial elections call into question the impartiality and fairness of
even the most upstanding judges. When litigants and attorneys with
major economic or ideological interests fund judicial campaigns, the
perception (if not the actuality) of improper influence leads people to
believe that justice is for sale. Public opinion surveys over the past
decade-plus demonstrate this point. 93
Judicial elections do not provide meaningful voter participation or
accountability to the electorate. Most judges are initially appointed to
fill a vacancy, and most sitting judges do not draw challengers.94
So what is the alternative? Many scholars and judicial luminaries
favor a system where non-partisan commissions submit slates of judicial
candidates to the governors. 95 This system is not perfect. Judges or
justices can still face pressure from outside influences 96--but there is no

91. Clark, supra note 78 at 706. Professor Clark continues: “Judges concerned about their reelection will not be independent. The very reason for having elections is to tether the politician to
the electorate, making for responsive legislators and executives. Judges tethered to the electorate,
on the other hand, will sacrifice justice and the rule of law to public opinion.” Id. As noted earlier,
these ties are not now just to the voters but to those who fund electoral campaigns based on how
they expect the judges to rule on specific issues.
92. See Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 788-89 (2002) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring). See also Judges for Sale, supra note 65, at A12.
93. See Bert Brandenburg & Rachel Paine Caufield, Ardent Advocates, 93 Judicature 79
(2009) (reviewing Chris W. Bonneau & Melinda Gann Hall, IN DEFENSE OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS
(2009)).
94. See Ted A. Schmidt, Fair Courts Under Fire: Part I: Merit Selection of Judges; Under
Attack without Merit, 42 ARIZ. ATTY. 13, 18 (2006); Charles Gardner Geyh, Perspectives on
Judicial Independence: Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 53 (2003); Scott
Williams Faulkner, Still on the Backburner: Reforming the Judicial Selection Process in Alabama,
52 ALA. L. REV. 1269, 1296 (2003); John M. Roll, Merit Selection: The Arizona Experience, 22
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 837, 855-56 (1990).
95. James J. Sample, Charles Hall & Linda Casey, THE NEW POLITICS OF JUDICIAL
ELECTIONS, 94 Judicature 50, 57 (2010) [hereinafter THE NEW POLITICS 2010]. See e.g. Letter from
Sandra Day O’Connor in THE NEW POLITICS 2009-2010, supra note 56, at i; Too Many States,
supra note 34, at 8A.
96. See generally Richard E. Flamm, History of and Problems with the Federal Judicial
Disqualification Framework, 58 DRAKE L. REV. 751 (2010).
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direct link of opinions, money, and support. It seems infinitely
preferable to the “triple whammies” of judicial election.

